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Abstract
For centuries in the UK and elsewhere, charities have been widely regarded as admirable and virtuous organisations. Busi-
ness corporations, by contrast, have been characterised in the popular imagination as entities that lack a capacity for moral 
judgement. Drawing on the philosophical literature on the moral agency of organisations, we examine how the law shapes 
the ability of charities and business corporations headquartered in England to exercise moral agency. Paradoxically, we find 
that charities are legally constrained in exercising moral agency in ways in which business corporations are not. Implications 
for charities and business corporations are then explored.
Keywords Charity law and regulation · Company law · Corporate moral agency
Introduction
If we look forward across the centuries, from their early 
roots in the religious orders which distributed alms to the 
needy, through to ‘the golden age of philanthropy’ which 
saw Victorian charities laying the foundations of what was 
later to become the modern welfare state (Grant 2014; Wil-
liams 1989), to the acts of generosity and self-sacrifice dis-
played by staff and volunteers in the contemporary charitable 
sector, it is not difficult to see how charities may be regarded, 
prima facie, as organisations of good moral standing. The 
House of Lords Select Committee on Charities describes 
them as the ‘eyes, ears and conscience of society’ (2017, 
p. 3). By contrast, for-profit business corporations in gen-
eral have been characterised as ‘soulless’ or even ‘psycho-
pathic’ organisations (Bakan 2004, p. 28). Friedman and 
Miles (2006, p. 20), for example, write that the potential for 
corporations ‘to do mischief to real people, combined with 
their lack of inherent moral sense, lack of a soul or ‘feel-
ings’ for the consequences of their actions on others, such 
as shame, remorse or gratitude’ has led to various solutions 
aimed at curbing their power.
Notwithstanding this popular antithesis between chari-
ties and business corporations, we assess whether the for-
mer have more capacity for moral agency, in the context of 
English law, than the latter. By ‘moral agency’, we mean a 
capacity to act (from agere, to do or to act) on the basis of 
moral judgements.1 Exploring the philosophical and legal 
literature on this topic, we examine how English law restricts 
(or enables) the ability of charities and business corpora-
tions to exercise moral agency. In particular, we look at how 
charity law2 constrains the capacity of trustees to exercise 
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1 Our understanding is that a ‘moral agent’ can act on a belief about 
whether an action is ‘good’ or ‘bad’, not merely as the most efficient 
means to an end, but in the light of considerations that are sensitive to 
conscience. The archetypical ‘moral agent’ is the individual human 
being; we later consider the sense in which an organisation itself can 
be a moral agent.
2 Our focus in this paper is charity law, as it is here that the con-
straints upon the moral agency of charities are first framed and origi-
nate. Clearly, however, the wider ‘regulatory’ context is also con-
tributory, and, depending on how this is defined, this can be taken to 
include everything from the law more generally, to ‘guidance’ issued 
by regulatory bodies such as the Charity Commission for England 
and Wales or the Information Commissioner, to sector ‘norms’, and 
donor behaviours. While it is beyond the scope of the paper to have 
taken a ‘broad gauge’ approach, such as a wider interpretation of 
the ‘regulatory context’ would entail, we do acknowledge this in the 
course of the article in relation to the role of the Charity Commis-
sion for England and Wales : arguably the foremost ‘prime mover’ (or 
‘framer’) next to the legal system itself.
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their consciences when acting on behalf of the charities they 
represent. We find that charity trustees are constrained in 
the exercise of conscience in ways that shareholders of a 
business corporation are not. Counter-intuitively, given the 
popular characterisations we have highlighted, our argument 
is that business corporations have greater capacity for moral 
agency than charities.
In England, charities are a legally recognised form of 
organisation, subject to particular legislative and regulatory 
requirements (Morris 2016; Harding 2014; Harding et al. 
2014; McGregor-Lowndes and O’Halloran 2010). Problem-
atically for English charities, for it is thought to be associated 
with lowering public trust in these organisations (Radojev 
2016a, b; Smith 2015; Charity Communications 2014), there 
is a growing disconnection between the concept of charity as 
applied in law and the public perception of what it is to be a 
charitable organisation (Synge 2015; dal Pont 2014; Harding 
2014; Parachin 2014). Thus, while notions that charities are 
essentially virtuous and altruistic shape public expectations 
of how these organisations ought to behave, being granted 
charitable status in law is not dependent upon, and does not 
require, the display of virtue by organisations seeking this 
status (dal Pont 2014; O’Halloran 2011). Instead, protecting 
the ‘objects’ which these organisations hold in trust is at the 
centre of charity law (Dekker and Harding 2014; Garton 
2014).
In the philosophical literature on corporate moral agency 
(e.g. French 1979; List and Pettit 2011), it has been argued 
that any organisation must act according to a specific pur-
pose if moral action can be meaningfully attributed to it. 
Charities are not unusual in this respect. However, we find 
that English law places specific restrictions on the ‘objects’ 
of charities, curtailing their scope for moral agency within 
the law. By comparison, it allows the shareholders and direc-
tors of business corporations more autonomy by giving them 
almost unlimited discretion in the purposes they pursue. Part 
of the explanation is to be found in how the law constitutes 
business corporations and charities: the former as a body 
governed in line with its members’ interests, and the latter as 
a trusteeship accountable immediately to the Charity Com-
mission for England and Wales (CCEW) and ultimately to 
donors, beneficiaries and the general public. This difference 
accounts in part, we argue, for the relative autonomy enjoyed 
by shareholders with respect to a corporation’s constitution 
and purpose, but which is lacking from the decision-making 
powers of charity trustees.
We have selected the English charitable context as our 
‘case study’ for a number of reasons. First, the issue that 
we examine here is highly relevant for English charities 
at the present time and is likely to remain so for the fore-
seeable future; yet, so far as we are aware, it has not been 
articulated and framed in the way presented in this article. 
Second, how ‘charity’ is conceptualised and the nature of 
accompanying legislative and regulatory requirements dif-
fer within different settings. Therefore, while modern-day 
England and Wales have adopted shared legislation and a 
shared regulatory body in the Charity Commission for Eng-
land and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland each have 
their own charities Acts and regulatory bodies in the form 
of the Charity Commission for Northern Ireland and the 
Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator. This is the case, 
too, in the wider Commonwealth nations, the USA, and 
indeed, wherever the concept is embraced (Harding 2014; 
Harding et al. 2014; McGregor-Lowndes and O’Halloran 
2010), whether particular countries have laws specifically 
pertaining to charities or not and whether they adopt the 
terminology of ‘charity’ or not (Piper 2012; 6 and Ran-
don 1991). However, countries that have developed laws 
and regulations pertaining to charities have tended to draw 
upon English law, as they have shaped and evolved law and 
regulation to suit their own specific needs and contexts 
(Harding et al. 2014; Piper 2012; McGregor-Lowndes and 
O’Halloran 2010; 6 and Randon 1991). So, within these 
wider settings, there is a tradition of learning and drawing 
insights and broad principles from the English experience, 
together with a tendency to adjust and adapt practices to 
suit particular contexts.
Third, instances of charities acting in morally question-
able ways are not confined to the English sector, with high-
profile examples in evidence in countries ranging from 
Germany, to the USA, to Singapore, among others (Hopt 
2010). For all of these reasons, we hope that our focus on 
the English context will provide a starting point for wider 
reflection and debate on the issue that we raise and examine 
in this article, not only within England and the wider UK, 
but wherever systems of charity law and regulation are in 
place or may emerge.
The article begins by setting out examples of charities 
behaving in ways at odds with public expectations. We then 
investigate the role of charity law in restricting the exercise 
of ‘moral agency’ on the part of charities, demonstrating that 
the directors and managers of business corporations may act 
for a wider range of reasons, including moral reasons, than 
their counterparts in charities. In conclusion, we consider 
the implications of our analysis for the moral responsibilities 
of institutional shareholders in shaping corporate activity. 
Moral Agency in Charities and Business Corporations: Exploring the Constraints of Law and…
1 3
Furthermore, we argue that a misalignment of public policy 
and popular sentiment has resulted in diminishing levels 
of public trust in charities, and that policy-makers should 
revisit this predicament.
Charities Behaving Badly
In recent years, we have witnessed a raft of decisions and 
behaviours that at best seem not to sit well with organisa-
tions of good moral standing and at worst are perceived by 
the media, members of the public and others, as unscru-
pulous acts. There has been growing disquiet about issues 
ranging from executive pay and packages (Weakley 2015a; 
Mason 2013; Public Administration Select Committee 
2013), to failure to pay the minimum and the living wage 
(Weakley 2015b), and the use of zero-hours contracts 
(Bloomfield 2013). There has been alarm, too, concern-
ing the use of seemingly generous exit packages and ‘gag-
ging’ clauses; the commodification and selling of personal 
data (BBC 2015; Radojev 2015); and the use of ‘bully-
ing’ approaches and ‘emotional blackmail’ in fundraising 
(Anonymous 2015; Ribeiro 2013), to give further exam-
ples. In 2013, it was reported that a high-profile charity had 
severed links with bodies set up to oversee employee pay 
levels and would be implementing its own pay scale. The 
same charity also dismissed its employees, subsequently 
re-employing them on new contracts with altered employ-
ment conditions. The new conditions allowed casual staff 
to be placed on zero-hours contracts, reduced redundancy 
entitlements for eligible staff and removed overtime pay-
ments (Mason 2013). In 2014, it was alleged in the national 
press that another well-known and well-established charity 
had not only made significant payments to departing staff, 
but had also required them to sign ‘gagging clauses’ (Shar-
man 2014a).
More recently, a charity professional stated publicly 
that the truth is regularly manipulated by charities so that 
people will feel compelled to donate, thereby allowing tar-
gets set by the management team and trustees to be met 
(Anonymous 2015). More recently still, the Office of the 
Information Commissioner has investigated claims that the 
personal details of an 87-year-old, suffering from dementia, 
were sold or passed on by charities as many as 200 times. 
This resulted in more than 700 requests for donations and 
the loss of £35,000 when his details eventually reached the 
hands of fraudsters (BBC 2015).
The purpose here is not to evaluate whether these and 
other decisions taken by charities are by any or all stand-
ards either morally good or bad. It is simply to indicate that 
the very practical decisions that charities make every day 
about everything from severance payments, to how much 
to pay their cleaning staff, to what information to provide 
to potential donors, to which clients to take on and which to 
turn away, to the issues on which they will campaign3 are, in 
essence, matters that ought to require the exercise of moral 
agency (White 2010; Polman 2010; Slim 2014; Ainsworth 
2017).
Charity Law and the Exercise of Moral Agency
Under English charity law, trustees have collective responsi-
bility for the charities over which they have oversight. Thus, 
how a charity exercises moral agency ought, ultimately, to be 
their collective responsibility. In discharging this responsi-
bility, however, charity law restricts the trustees in a number 
of ways (Morris 2016; Harries 2015; Dekker and Harding 
2014; Hodgson 2012). Most crucially, in light of the public 
perception of what it is to be charitable, they are denied the 
liberty to act freely in line with their consciences. While 
trustees are each free to express their positions and discuss 
matters of moral concern, it is the fulfilment of the charitable 
‘object(s)’ or purpose(s) that is sacrosanct and prime, and 
charities must not act in ways that may impact negatively 
on their achievement (Charity Commission for England and 
Wales 2015a; Harding 2014; Bates Wells and Braithwaite 
2008).
So, while the trustees may know that by making employ-
ees redundant they will be unable to pay their mortgages, the 
impact on the employees and their families cannot be per-
mitted to influence the trustees’ decision. They may consider 
whether the charitable object can continue to be delivered 
in the absence of the staff redundancies and the budgetary 
savings that will follow from this course of action, but they 
cannot base their decision on the consequences that redun-
dancies will have on the employees or their families. This is 
so, even though charities must deliver ‘public benefit’ as a 
key qualifying criterion for the awarding of charitable status. 
Thus, while it might be argued that there is public benefit 
in not making staff redundant, here, public benefit has the 
particular and narrower definition as laid out in the Charities 
Act 2011 (CA 2011). Under the Act, concerns with public 
benefit are directly related, and restricted, to the charitable 
3 Campaigning to change public and corporate policy as well as 
public attitudes is a key part of the work that some charities do and 
clearly matters of ethics and conscience are synonymous with this. 
Here, too, charity law imposes constraints on the actions of chari-
ties. We do not look at this aspect of charity law in this article as this 
area is currently being reviewed by the Government and is an evolv-
ing field at this time. Current indications are that it may become more 
restrictive. It is intended that this will be the subject of a future paper.
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objects4 and their benefit to the public or a section of the 
public deemed to be ‘sufficiently numerous’.5 If in deliver-
ing the objects, there is some justifiable ‘private benefit’ to 
employees, through receiving a salary, that is fine, but it is 
the implications for the public benefit which must guide the 
decisions of trustees.
In the same way, the payment of competitive salaries and 
accompanying ‘packages’ to a number of senior staff may 
permit the charity substantially to improve its performance 
and therefore deliver its object more effectively. Even so, 
a decision of this nature may give concern to the trustees, 
not least because those whom they help are on the poverty 
line and few of their donors will enjoy similarly generous 
salaries and packages. The trustees are bound to consider 
the consequences of these remunerations on the charity’s 
reputation and brand. They may decide that the risk to the 
charity’s reputation and brand are too significant, and that 
donated income may markedly decline if existing and poten-
tial donors learn of the remunerations paid to staff. As this 
would adversely impact on the charity’s ability to deliver its 
object, based on this evaluation the trustees may decide to 
revise the policy on remuneration of senior staff. What they 
may not do, however, is revise the policy because they regard 
the levels of remuneration as unconscionable when looked 
at in the context of those dependent on their services or the 
circumstances of their donors. Thus, while the requirement 
to consider the consequences to reputation and brand allow 
wider latitude to the trustees’ reflections, they do so only in 
respect of the implications for the charitable object.
In their role as actors in the democratic polity charities 
are seen to represent and provide a ‘voice’ to those who 
would otherwise be marginalised and without influence 
(Purkis 2016; Harries 2015). Here, too, though, they must 
operate within the constraints of law. While various laws, 
standards and codes of conduct limit how charities under-
take the range of activities that comprise this area of work, 
charity law determines that charities restrict their advocacy 
to issues in support of their object (Charity Commission for 
England and Wales 2008). Their right to advocate within 
the democratic polity is not a blanket right to campaign on 
issues of moral concern per se (Morris 2016; and see, for 
example, cases Webb v. O’Doherty 1991; Baldry v. Feintuck 
1972; National Anti-Vivisection Society, 1948).
English charity law goes further than this, though. It 
also prohibits charities from existing purely with the aim of 
securing or opposing a change in the law or for other ‘politi-
cal purposes’ within England and in other countries in which 
the charities operate. Thus, and to draw from an example 
given by the Charity Commission for England and Wales 
(2008), if government policy is to allow the building of 
new runways at airports, an organisation established solely 
with the aim of bringing about a change in policy cannot be 
granted charitable status. Charities engaging in campaigning 
activities may do so only in support of, and ancillary to, their 
objects. Thus, to take a second example from the Charity 
Commission for England and Wales’s (2008) guidance on 
campaigning and political activity, if a charity that provided 
counselling and refuge to victims of torture decided that 
this community and its own moral position would be better 
served by withdrawing these services and campaigning to 
expose the regime responsible, it could not do so and retain 
its charitable status. Nor are charities permitted to engage 
in activities that might be regarded as demonstrating sup-
port for one political party or another, however their policies 
sit with the consciences of the trustees. They may evaluate 
and set out the implications of a change of policy for their 
service users, but they must do so in a way that cannot be 
regarded as partisan.
Nor is it the case that altering the charitable objects would 
necessarily give trustees more latitude for moral discretion. 
There are limited grounds on which trustees (and others) can 
have the objects varied to accommodate their moral con-
cerns about a trust’s original purpose. For example, trust 
property can be applied cy-prés (‘as near as possible’) by a 
court to ensure ‘purposes which are suitable and effective in 
the light of current social and economic circumstances’ (CA 
2011, s 67(3)). In the case of Canada Trust Co. v Ontario 
Human Rights Commission [1990] 69 DLR (4th) 321, a trust 
limiting the provision of scholarships to white Protestants 
was found to violate public policy on discrimination, and 
the condition imposing the restriction was therefore declared 
void. However, in such a case the trustees are still bound to 
implement what a court affirms to be the legitimate objects 
of the trust (e.g. those consistent with ‘current social circum-
stances’). They are not permitted to exercise moral judge-
ment in pursuit of any objective beyond these terms.
Similarly, trustees who wish to offer a wider range of ser-
vices than their objects permit must apply to have the objects 
changed, rather than act outside their scope. For example, 
4 Commenting on the meaning of ‘public benefit’, Philip H. Pettit 
writes that the benefits ‘must be related to the aims of the institu-
tion… The benefit from accidental and unplanned activities, or from 
incidental activities not related to a purpose of an institution, do not 
count towards the assessment of benefits’ (2012, p. 285).
5 The difficulties encountered by the judiciary in deciding whether 
a charity’s intended beneficiaries are a ‘section of the public’ are 
summarised by Pettit (2012, pp. 286–288). One problem concerns 
whether a section of the public must necessarily be identified by an 
‘impersonal’ quality shared by its members, or whether it could be 
constituted by particular individuals. For example, a company’s 
employees would not normally count as a section of the public, but 
if all the members of one profession (therefore sharing an ‘imper-
sonal’ characteristic) were to be employed by one employer, the ques-
tion would not be so easy to answer (ibid.). Trusts established for the 
relief of poverty are the exception to the rule: they may have charita-
ble status even though the intended beneficiaries do not form a sec-
tion of the public (ibid., p. 292).
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the recent decision by Parliament permitting the Peoples 
Dispensary for Sick Animals (PDSA) to amend its objects, 
thereby enabling it to charge for services based upon a per-
son’s ability to pay for these (Sharman 2014b; Charity Com-
mission for England and Wales 2014; Cabinet Office 2015) 
does not remove the constraints of charity law. It simply 
means that the options and consequences which exist now, 
within the PDSA, are different to those that went before.
Charities and Corporate Moral Agency
Is the moral agency of a charitable organisation therefore 
constrained to the extent that it must act according to its 
objects?6 In other words, does the requirement to prioritise 
the charity’s purpose necessarily curtail the trustees’ scope 
for moral decision-making? To address this concern, we 
turn to the literature on the moral agency of organisations. 
Although philosophers writing on this topic use the term 
‘corporate’ moral agency and typically assume a context 
of commercial organisations (e.g. French 1979; Goodpas-
ter and Matthews 1982; Moore 1999; Velasquez 2003, p. 
533; Arnold 2006), their arguments do not apply only to 
legal corporations or to the for-profit sector. Rönnegard 
and Velasquez (2017, pp. 123–124) are explicit that it is 
the moral agency of organisations, or organised groups in 
general, that is in question.7 Drawing on this literature, we 
first explore the intuition that a statement of purpose curtails 
an organisation’s agency. At this stage, we work merely with 
the idea that an organisation has ‘agency’, which is to say 
that actions may be attributed to it that are not the actions 
of its individual members. We then consider the more prob-
lematic (and much criticised) notion that an organisation 
is a moral agent, and advance a qualified endorsement of 
this position, before returning to the effects of charity and 
company law.
A point of agreement in the literature is that if an organi-
sation has agency, it necessarily has purposes of its own 
that may differ from the separate goals of its members. A 
statement of purpose, or objects clause, would therefore not 
constrain organisational agency, but would be entailed by it. 
Without this assumption, one could not distinguish actions 
that belong to the whole organisation and for which mem-
bers may share responsibility, from those taken by only one 
member or a few that do not represent the whole group. 
On this point, French (1979, p. 213) argues: ‘a corporate 
decision is recognised… by the policy it instantiates. Hence 
every corporation creates an image (not to be confused with 
its public image) or a general policy… that must inform its 
decisions for them to be properly described as being those 
of the corporation’. A corporate act, in other words, is one 
that is consistent with ‘established corporate policy’ (ibid.). 
Likewise, following (French 1979), Arnold (2006, p. 289) 
writes that ‘to know how to act employees must have knowl-
edge of how they are expected to act… Employees should 
have the appropriate intention, and if they do not they fail to 
properly represent the corporation’ (emphasis in original). 
Furthermore, Manning (1984, p. 80) contends that ‘it is by 
appeal to the goals of the organisation that we are able to 
ascribe an action to the organisation. If a captain runs a ship 
aground his action is not ascribed to the Navy, but if he 
takes his ship on routine maneuvers this action is ascribed 
to the Navy’.
If it is meaningful to attribute to an organisation the 
capacity to act (whether morally or not), then the organisa-
tion is logically required to have a specific purpose. Moreo-
ver, if ‘organisational’ actions are derived ultimately from 
the judgements or preferences of individual members (e.g. 
employees and shareholders), it is necessary to know by 
what criteria ‘membership’ is established: here again the 
presence of a defining purpose is necessary. To distinguish a 
‘conglomerate’ (i.e. a group agent that can act) from a mere 
‘aggregate’ of individuals, Pfeiffer (1990, p. 478) argues: 
‘such categorisation requires… a claim about the relevant 
purpose of those whose judgement is accepted as the basis 
for applying the membership criterion… The verdict in spe-
cific cases depends on which purposes one adopts’.
There is little agreement among these authors on which 
stakeholders should count as ‘members’ and therefore from 
whose actions the organisation’s agency derives. In the case 
of the business corporation, French (1979, p. 212) includes 
everyone who is part of the ‘personnel organisation for the 
exercise of the corporation’s power’ or, in other words, the 
corporation’s ‘internal decision structure’. On the other 
hand, Arnold (2006, p. 288) refers specifically to employ-
ees, whereas Moore (1999, p. 338) follows the legal position 
in the UK and USA in identifying the organisational ‘state 
of mind’ with the acts of directors and managers. Unusu-
ally, List and Pettit (2011, p. 40) also include shareholders. 
Having claimed that corporations ‘exhibit the characteristics 
of agency in full dress’, they assert: ‘shareholders, direc-
tors, managers, and workers combine, often in subsidiary 
units, to ensure that they pursue the overall goals of their 
corporations’.
Notwithstanding these differences, the authors concur 
that an organisation’s agency must be distinguishable from 
the attitudes of its individual members. This is a concern 
6 David Ciepley articulates a similar intuition in the context of a cor-
poration’s charter: all corporations declare a purpose ‘in the founding 
charter that constrains the agency of the operating group’ and ‘the 
fact that corporations have an authorised purpose does not mean they 
have agency… the one constrains the other’ (2015, pp. 28–29).
7 Pettit (2007, p. 172) lists churches, universities, partnerships, vol-
untary associations and even town meetings as examples of ‘corpo-
rate agents’.
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that we have raised in the case of charities, but it appears 
to hold across organisational forms. List and Pettit (2011, 
pp. 43–58) demonstrate that if group-level judgements are 
based on the corresponding attitudes of individual members, 
e.g. through majority voting on every proposition put before 
the group, then inconsistent group attitudes may follow—
even where the members’ attitudes are consistent. As Pettit 
(2007, p. 183) argues, if members are to ensure the consist-
ency of their collective decisions, they ‘will have to create 
a group agent that comes apart in that manner from the way 
that they are individually disposed’. And furthermore, the 
‘group judgement may even be a judgement that every mem-
ber rejects’ (2007, p. 182).
The point is that group members can simulate the behav-
iour of an individual agent through a procedure that incor-
porates their attitudes into a ‘group view’ that is consistent 
from one decision to the next. As List and Pettit (2011, p. 
75) put it: ‘let a collection of individuals form and act on a 
single, robustly rational body of attitudes… and it will be an 
agent’. Furthermore, it will be autonomous ‘to the extent that 
the features that make it an agent… are not readily reducible 
to features of the individual members: again, crucially, their 
attitudes’ (pp. 76–77). Rönnegard and Velasquez (2017, p. 
136), while criticising Pettit’s argument for holding groups 
morally responsible, nonetheless concede that the organi-
sation’s ‘procedural choice is inconsistent with member 
attitudes’.8
French (1979, p. 214) had arrived at a similar conclusion: 
‘the melding of disparate interests and purposes gives rise 
to a long range point of view that is distinct from the intents 
and purposes of the collection of incorporators viewed indi-
vidually’. More recently, Soares (2003, p. 145) argued that 
corporations ‘have interests in pursuing their established 
corporate goals despite the temporary, conflicting self-
interests of managers and directors’.
Earlier we outlined the predicament facing charity trus-
tees concerning the influence of their individual consciences 
on the pursuit of the charitable object. However, we find that 
a formal purpose which enables organisational decisions that 
‘come apart’ from members’ attitudes is arguably a neces-
sary condition for ascribing any action to an organisation. In 
this respect, there may be nothing distinctive about charities. 
Yet before developing a comparison with the business cor-
poration to see if this finding holds, we must expand our con-
ception of organisational agency. So far, we have affirmed 
only that it is meaningful to speak of an organisation acting. 
But this is to say nothing of the moral quality of an organisa-
tion’s actions, or of the moral capacities that an agent fit to 
be held responsible must possess. This is, after all, what is 
at stake in asking how the law constrains a charity’s ability 
to act upon moral judgements. Indeed, there are compelling 
reasons to think that an organisation is not a moral agent in 
its own right.
The most persuasive reason, in our view, is that an organi-
sation lacks the requisite internal capacities (e.g. for guilt, 
shame and empathy) that it would require to be an agent 
bearing moral (and not merely legal) rights and responsi-
bilities. Velasquez (2003) argues that moral responsibility 
requires intention (p. 543), and organisational procedures 
for reaching collective decisions [of the kind defended by 
French (1979), and List and Pettit (2011)] cannot ‘transform 
a metaphorical intention into a real one’ because ‘proce-
dures and policies… cannot create group mental states nor 
group minds in any literal sense’ (p. 546). Real intentionality 
requires a ‘unified consciousness’, which means that all the 
agent’s intentions and beliefs are held in a ‘single field of 
awareness’ (p. 550). An organisation does not itself possess 
such a capacity. For the same reason, we can argue that an 
organisation does not literally have a conscience, because 
this would entail an internal sense, or consciousness, of right 
and wrong.
Moreover, Rönnegard and Velasquez (2017, p. 134) hold 
that a morally responsible agent has ‘personal autonomy’: 
an ‘ability to hold a vantage point that is distinct from the 
agent’s desires and allows the agent to choose which desire 
to act upon’. They ask whether the aggregation of member 
judgements to form a group view (as expounded by List and 
Pettit 2011) can generate personal autonomy in this ‘mor-
ally relevant sense’ (p. 136). They conclude that it cannot, 
because ‘there is no sense in which a procedure is aware of 
its choice’ (ibid.). Furthermore, Sepinwall (2017) explores 
the place of emotion in holding an agent to be an appropriate 
target for blame. The conclusion is again that organisations 
are deficient in this respect: ‘it makes sense to blame only 
those who can experience guilt, affect is required to experi-
ence guilt, corporations have no capacity for affect, and so it 
makes no sense to blame corporations’ (p. 144).
A further difficulty in treating organisations as moral 
agents is to determine a fair basis for apportioning respon-
sibility among the members for what the organisation does 
in their name. ‘Member responsibility’, according to List 
and Pettit (2011, p. 164), ‘is the responsibility that individu-
als have as the members of a group agent that does good or 
bad. It is derivative from the group agent’s responsibility… 
although, importantly, their levels of member responsibility 
may vary with their roles in the group’. They add that even 
where some members are powerless to stop a group act-
ing as it does, they may share in the group’s responsibility 
8 Furthermore, Velasquez (2003, p. 544), though arguing persua-
sively that organisations lack the capacity for moral agency, allows 
that: ‘Intentional properties such as purposes and beliefs, can be 
attributed to groups on the basis of a pattern which the activities of its 
members exhibit… And because the pattern is the result of the activi-
ties of many of the group’s members, the intentional property… can-
not be attributed to any single member.’
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‘to the extent that they… explicitly or implicitly endorse 
the group’s actions’ (ibid.). Hasnas (2012) considers the 
implications of such an argument for the criminal punish-
ment of organisations and raises a legitimate objection. He 
clarifies that moral responsibility is a prerequisite for blame, 
and blame merits punishment: ‘if corporations are morally 
responsible agents, then they are properly eligible for crimi-
nal punishment…’ (p. 190). He then argues that imposing 
such punishment on an organisation amounts to ‘vicarious 
collective punishment’, which is inherently unjust. He writes 
that ‘there is no definite object to absorb the punishment’: 
the costs pass through to various stakeholders (consumers, 
employees, shareholders, etc.), all of whom may be innocent 
of personal wrongdoing (p. 191). He demonstrates the incon-
gruity of attributing moral responsibility to the organisation 
as a whole, precisely because of its imprecise extension to 
the members’ individual responsibilities.9
To conclude this section, we agree with List and Pettit 
(2011) that a group’s members can simulate an individual, 
rational agent by coordinating their judgements into ‘a single 
system of attitudes held by the group as a whole’ (p. 59). In 
this manner, they create a ‘group agent’, which may or may 
not have legal personality. However, if one accepts that to be 
morally responsible requires a unified consciousness, which 
the members possess individually, but their organisation 
does not, then what they cannot simulate is an individual 
moral agent. Hence, they cannot create a moral group agent, 
with rights and responsibilities of its own.
Does it follow that the idea of organisational moral 
agency is altogether redundant? We do not believe that it 
does. We see no reason to assume that an organisation’s 
agency (i.e. the decisions taken on behalf of all the mem-
bers) is necessarily a-moral, still less ‘psychopathic’ (Bakan 
2004, p. 28). Implicit in the view that charities are moral 
organisations capable of acting as the ‘conscience of soci-
ety’ (as the House of Lords report puts it) is the assumption 
that their trustees can act on collective judgements that are 
sensitive to moral considerations. An organisation’s collec-
tive decisions can be described as ‘moral’, not only to the 
extent that they happen to cohere with social norms, but also 
insofar as they are responsive to moral concerns. This is not 
to say that the charity itself is a responsible moral agent. 
However, as List and Pettit put it: ‘since the members of any 
group are able to form judgements on normative proposi-
tions in their individual lives, there is no principled reason 
why they should not be able to propose such propositions 
for group consideration and resolution—that is, for inclu-
sion in the group’s agenda’ (2011, p. 159). To the extent 
that the members have the opportunity to debate matters of 
conscience that bear on the pursuit of the organisation’s pur-
pose, and thus to enact collective decisions that encompass 
moral judgements, we can speak appropriately of an organi-
sation as a ‘moral’ agent.10 It is in this qualified sense that 
we now consider how the law constrains the moral agency 
of charities and business corporations.
Charities and Business Corporations
List and Pettit find it implausible that an organisation might 
be designed without a capacity to form collective attitudes 
on moral questions. They ask why any group of individuals 
should ‘be allowed to incorporate under an organisational 
structure that deprives the group of the ability to assess its 
options normatively…’ (2011, p. 159). In the case of a busi-
ness corporation, typically there is at least one set of organi-
sational members—i.e. the shareholders (simply called ‘the 
members’ in UK company law)11—who have the power to 
enforce normative judgements about the corporation’s con-
stitution and purpose, through their possession of certain 
legal rights. Moreover, unlike charities, business corpora-
tions today are rarely restricted legally to the pursuit of a 
specific purpose and there is considerable flexibility in law 
allowing both existing and new business corporations to 
engage in purposes which take them beyond profit-making 
(Wilson 2016). Before 2006, a company registered in the UK 
could not deviate from the ‘objects’ stated in its memoran-
dum of association (Dine and Koutsias 2007). However, the 
Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) states: ‘unless a company’s 
articles specifically restrict the objects of the company, its 
objects are unrestricted’ (s 31(1)). The implication is that 
directors are largely freed from the constraint of a statement 
of objects. Hannigan (2015, p. 95) notes that companies 
formed under the new act ‘generally do not restrict their 
objects… and therefore most companies have unrestricted 
capacity and no issue of ultra vires can arise’.
9 Historically, similar arguments have been made by advocates of the 
so-called fiction theory of corporate personhood, which holds that the 
‘will’ of a corporation is not ‘natural’ but ‘artificial’ (man-made). For 
example, in On the Citizen (1997), Thomas Hobbes writes that if a 
decision contrary to ‘natural law’ is made on behalf of the body poli-
tic, ‘the offender is not the commonwealth itself… but the citizens 
who voted for the decision. For an offence issues from an expression 
of natural will, not from a political will, which is artificial; because if 
it were the latter, those who voted against the decision would also be 
offenders’ (1997, p. 97).
10 The language of organisational moral agency can also be used 
appropriately in a non-literal sense: i.e., when it stands for ‘the inter-
actions among an amorphous group of people that produce morally 
unacceptable results’ (Hasnas 2012, p. 194). When used for ‘purely 
expressive purposes’, such language ‘reduces communicative transac-
tion costs’ (Hasnas, ibid.).
11 In the UK, while charity law is devolved, company law (in the 
form of the Companies Act, 2006) extends to the whole of the UK.
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The fact that UK law allows unfettered discretion on the 
matter of corporate purpose does not, of course, imply that 
directors can interpret the goal of the company, however, 
they choose. As fiduciaries they owe ‘undivided loyalty’ 
to the company, which means they must promote its suc-
cess without profiting from their position or entering into 
engagements that risk a conflict of interests (Hannigan 
2015, p. 257). But how are the interests of the company 
to be construed? The law vests ultimate authority to deter-
mine the purpose of the company, and to hold directors 
accountable for its pursuit, in the shareholders as a body.12 
Section 172 states that: ‘a director of a company must act 
in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely 
to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole…’ (CA 2006, s 172(1)). The ‘mem-
bers’ in a company with share capital are the shareholders 
(s 8(1b)). In Hannigan’s interpretation of section 172, ‘‘suc-
cess’ is a matter for the members to determine; they define 
the objectives of the company and then it is for the direc-
tors to promote the success of the company in those terms’ 
(2015, p. 215). Accordingly, shareholders collectively have 
the right, for example, to appoint (s 160) and remove direc-
tors (s 168(1)), to approve directors’ long-term contracts 
(s 188) and to amend the company’s constitution (s 21(1)). 
Shareholders may also authorise directors’ actions (or omis-
sions) that would otherwise breach the fiduciary duties (e.g. 
the ‘no-conflict’ rule) directors owe to the company, or to 
ratify such actions later (CA 2006, s 180(4); Hannigan 
2015, pp. 259–260).
Furthermore, they can submit and vote on proposals that 
would commit directors to addressing social and environ-
mental issues, e.g. by preparing a sustainability report or 
implementing International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
standards. Despite the lack of widespread support for such 
proposals (Buchanan, et al. 2010), shareholders can in the-
ory limit the imperative to maximise profits with corporate 
policies that serve the ends of non-shareholding stakeholders 
(Mansell 2013).
One might think that institutional investors, who now 
own the majority of financial assets in global capital markets 
(Hawley et al. 2014, p. 1), are bound to maximise short-term 
financial gains for their beneficiaries. However, a growing 
body of work finds this not to be the case. For example, 
Sandberg et al. (2014, pp. 354–355) explore how benefi-
ciaries understand their own ‘best interests’ in the context 
of fiduciary duty. For their respondents, personal wealth is 
overall the ‘least important factor’ and few favour a ‘strictly 
financial’ conception of the fiduciary duties owed to them. 
Moreover, 95 per cent of their respondents ‘answered that 
pension funds should consider SEE [social, ethical and envi-
ronmental] issues in investment decisions’ (ibid., p. 355). 
Shareholders indeed hold a privileged position in UK law 
in which they authorise directors to act in the company’s 
interests. Or, as List and Pettit (2011, pp. 35–36) put it, they 
‘authorise’ other members of the group agent (i.e. workers, 
managers and directors) to act on behalf of the whole group. 
Legally, the use shareholders make of this authority may be 
informed by their moral judgements and need not be limited 
to the pursuit of short-term financial gain.
By contrast, in English law none of these characteristics 
of a business corporation hold for a charitable organisation. 
There are no ‘authorising’ members, akin to shareholders, 
who define what counts as ‘success’ for the charity and 
authorise trustees to act on their behalf. To a certain extent, 
the Charity Commission takes an equivalent role.13 It can, 
for example, grant relief ‘to a charity trustee… who appears 
to be personally liable for breach of trust or duty in relation 
to the trust where it considers that he has acted honestly and 
reasonably…’ (Pettit 2012, pp. 312–313; CA 2011, s 191). 
In a business corporation, as we saw above, shareholders 
have the equivalent authority to ratify a breach of fiduciary 
duty by directors. However, power in the former case rests 
with an external agency that exists to regulate the entire 
sector in accordance with the ‘public interest’—an interest 
which is not responsive to, and does not depend upon, the 
purposes that a given charity is founded to accomplish. By 
comparison, shareholders have greater liberty to define and 
interpret the purposes of the business corporations in which 
they invest, thus allowing more flexibility in the objectives 
that directors can pursue.
What is paramount for a charity, as we noted earlier, is 
that when trustees are to make any decision their options 
must be weighed strictly in relation to the charitable objects. 
Although the Charities Act gives trustees the power to make 
social investments (CA 2011, s 292B), part of its defini-
tion of a ‘social investment’ is that it is carried out with 
a view to ‘directly furthering the charity’s purposes’ (CA 
2011, s 292A). The trustees’ moral judgements therefore 
cannot encroach upon the pursuit of the charity’s object. And 
neither the organisation as a whole (e.g. the trustees, staff, 
volunteers and donors), nor any subset of members are free 
to amend the objects to permit value judgements that would 
otherwise conflict with them.
The Charities Act 2011 allows charities access to a num-
ber of corporate forms (including charitable companies, 
13 The authors would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this 
suggestion.
12 This is the case notwithstanding the infrequency with which indi-
vidual shareholders exercise their legal powers. Ireland (1999) charts 
the historical process through which shareholders, through the nine-
teenth century, relinquished their role as active owners of company 
property.
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charitable incorporated organisations (CIOs) and incor-
porations of charity trustees). Crucially, what each has in 
common is that the organisation is established solely for 
a ‘charitable purpose’ that ‘is for the public benefit’ (CA 
2011, s 2(1)). If any charity wishes to alter its stated pur-
pose, it is constrained by these criteria and must refer such a 
request to the Charity Commission for England and Wales. 
For example, a charitable company cannot alter its state-
ment of objects (s 198), or approve a director’s long-term 
service contract (s 201), without the Commission’s prior 
written consent. Likewise, the members of a CIO cannot 
alter its constitution without the Commission’s consent (s 
226). Similar restrictions apply to incorporated charity trus-
tees and unincorporated charities. By contrast, a business 
corporation would refer all such decisions to its members.
Might it be objected that nothing precludes a charitable 
organisation from making value judgements that do not con-
flict with its purpose? Can it not draw on the consciences of 
its members to evaluate a restricted set of normative propo-
sitions? Indeed it could. However, every such proposition 
would be judged only as a means to the achievement of the 
stated purpose. Pettit (2007, p. 185) writes that a group agent 
fit to be held responsible ‘will be able to make judgements 
as to the relative value of the options that they face…’ We 
see no reason why this cannot be true of charity trustees; 
however, value would be determined relative to the charity’s 
object. Pettit (2007, p. 175) argues that a responsible agent 
‘faces a value-relevant choice involving the possibility of 
doing something good or bad or right or wrong’. It is not 
that charity trustees do not face value-relevant choices, but 
rather that the content of ‘right or wrong’ is circumscribed 
by a narrow (or, to follow Kant, a ‘perfect’) duty to pursue 
the charitable object.
This is not to suggest that an organisation with charitable 
status is incapable of actions that conflict with its objects, 
for in that case there would be no need for the oversight 
of the Charity Commission. Ultra vires acts may indeed 
be informed by the moral judgement of the trustees, and 
accordingly be described as an exercise of moral agency, 
notwithstanding their illegality. For example, in its Case 
Report: Campaigning and Political Issues Arising in the 
Run-up to the 2015 General Election (2015b), the Char-
ity Commission for England and Wales sets out a number 
of instances in which charities had to be reminded of the 
law prohibiting campaigning for a political party. These 
included the publishing of a letter on its public website by 
the National Council of Hindu Temples (UK) encouraging 
support for a particular political party in the General Elec-
tion; the promotion by The Badger Trust of a march entitled 
‘Stop Cameron’s Cull’; and a blog by the Chief Executive 
Officer of the League Against Cruel Sports entitled ‘Mak-
ing Our Votes Count for Wildlife and Animals’. The point is 
rather that, in restricting the objects a charity can pursue, the 
law limits the range of decisions trustees might refer to their 
consciences, and vests the interpretation of this limit in an 
external body. By contrast, commercial organisations (e.g. 
business corporations) are relatively unconstrained.
Charities and Bodies Corporate
Part of the explanation for this contrast is that a commercial 
organisation can refer to its membership a judgement about 
its fundamental purpose, whereas a charity cannot. While 
this difference holds between charities and all commercial 
organisations (e.g. partnerships and sole traders), it is illus-
trated here in the context of the corporate form. We there-
fore look at how shareholders are understood collectively in 
company law, in contrast to the donors and beneficiaries of 
a charity. According to the Companies Act 2006, an ‘effect 
of registration’ is that: ‘the subscribers to the memorandum, 
together with such other persons as may from time to time 
become members of the company, are a body corporate by 
the name stated in the certificate of incorporation’ (s 16(2)). 
As the ‘body corporate’ simply is the corporation as a person 
in law, legal capacity is effectively granted to the sharehold-
ers as a body.14 It follows that directors are legally account-
able to shareholders for their pursuit of the corporation’s 
purposes. Charity trustees, on the other hand, are account-
able to the charity’s beneficiaries, members (if it has them) 
and to those who fund them, but also to the Charity Com-
mission—to whom they must refer all questions bearing on 
the charity’s purpose. Furthermore, the Commission may 
intervene to direct the trustees ‘to take any action that the 
Commission considers to be expedient in the interests of the 
charity’ and ‘may require action to be taken whether or not 
it would otherwise be within the powers exercisable by the 
person or persons concerned’ (CA 2011, s 84; Pettit 2012, p. 
310). This restriction on the trustees’ autonomy means that, 
unlike a business corporation, a charity is not an independent 
‘body corporate’ able to exercise its moral agency in pursuit 
of ‘any lawful purpose’.
We noted earlier that the Charity Commission may be 
considered to act in an equivalent capacity to sharehold-
ers. The Commission has a certain degree of independence 
insofar as it is ‘not subject to the direction or control of any 
Minister of the Crown or of another government department’ 
(CA 2011, s 13(4)). However, its chairman and other mem-
bers are ‘appointed by the Minister for the Cabinet Office’ 
and it must report to Parliament annually on the extent to 
which its objectives have been met (among other matters) 
(Pettit 2012, pp. 307–308).
14 Hannigan (2015, p. 101) supports the view that, in the context 
of the company’s constitution, the phrase ‘the company as a whole’ 
means ‘the shareholders as a body’ (or ‘the corporators as a whole’).
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Among the Commission’s statutory objectives is an 
‘accountability objective’: ‘to enhance the accountability of 
charities to donors, beneficiaries and the general public’ (CA 
2011, s 14(5)). But it is not assumed that donors, beneficiar-
ies and the general public together form ‘bodies corporate’ 
to whom charity trustees are accountable in the manner in 
which directors are answerable to shareholders. Nor can it be 
said that donors, beneficiaries and the public form part of a 
‘group agent’ that encompasses trustees, staff and volunteers 
or, in the case of business corporations, shareholders, direc-
tors and employees (List and Pettit 2011, p. 40). Indeed, it 
is rarely (if ever) the case that donors, beneficiaries and the 
public have a direct collective voice in the running of a char-
ity. Instead, their interests are deemed to be represented by 
the charity’s ‘purpose’ as restricted by the ‘public benefit’ 
condition; and the authority to interpret this condition rests 
exclusively with the Charity Commission for England and 
Wales.
The relevant contrast is not therefore between charities 
and corporations per se. As we have observed, charities in 
English law can choose between several corporate forms. 
And as FW Maitland (2003) found, in his historical work on 
the English trust, the members of an unincorporated trust 
often had reason to act as corporations, and were viewed by 
the courts as if they were corporations, but operated behind 
a ‘wall of trustees’ who did not wish to invite the scrutiny of 
the state that would accompany formal incorporation. Mait-
land calls such entities ‘unincorporated bodies’ (2003, p. 
104), i.e. bodies with members, but, ironically, without legal 
incorporation. An example is the London Stock Exchange 
which, from the early nineteenth century, had a large body 
of fee-paying members, a smaller body of proprietors who 
contributed a share capital of £20,000, and the board of trus-
tees. In 1878, the members rejected a recommendation that 
they be incorporated by royal charter (Maitland 2003, pp. 
108–109). However, Maitland writes that it would not ‘be 
easy to find anything that a corporation could do and that is 
not being done’ by this society (2003, p. 109).
The relevant distinction is between an organisation that 
has a ‘body of members’ able to interpret the corporate 
purpose and hold directors to account, and one which does 
not. Maitland contrasts a trust such as the London Stock 
Exchange (with its ‘unincorporated body’ of members) to 
a charitable trust. In the latter case, there is ‘no pressing 
demand for a personal destinatory. We can, if we please, 
think of the charitable [purpose] as filling the place that is 
filled by a person in the ordinary private trust’ (Maitland 
2003, p. 104). In England today, as we have seen, the chari-
table purpose must conform to conditions established by the 
latest Charities Act. Even if the trustees were to succeed in 
altering their ‘object’, they could not have more autonomy 
than is permitted by the definitions of ‘charitable purpose’ 
and ‘public benefit’ in the interpretation of the Charity 
Commission for England and Wales. To this extent, the 
shareholders of a business corporation are better able than 
charity trustees to implement their collective judgements on 
moral questions.
Implications for Charities and Business Corporations
In this section of the paper, we set out the implications 
for charities, for business corporations and for other bod-
ies including public policy-makers. Turning first to chari-
ties, we have noted the growing disconnection between 
the concept of charity as applied in law and the public 
perception of what it is to be a charitable organisation on 
the one hand (Synge 2015; dal Pont 2014; Harding 2014; 
Parachin 2014), and associated lowering public trust in 
these organisations on the other hand (Radojev 2016a, b; 
Smith 2015; Charity Communications 2014). We have 
observed that while notions that charities are essentially 
of good moral standing shape public expectations of these 
organisations, being granted charitable status in law is 
not dependent upon a display of virtue (dal Pont 2014; 
O’Halloran 2011). Instead, protecting the ‘objects’ which 
these organisations hold in trust, while ensuring they are 
delivered in ways that fulfil the public benefit test, is what 
charity law requires (Dekker and Harding 2014; Garton 
2014). We highlighted a number of issues, such as failure 
to pay the minimum wage (Weakley 2015b) and the use of 
zero-hours contracts (Bloomfield 2013), which do not sit 
well with the perception that charities are the conscience 
of society (House of Lords 2017). These seemingly unwor-
thy behaviours have been roundly criticised by the media, 
members of the public, and others. Our analysis has dem-
onstrated, however, that there may be circumstances in 
which trustees take decisions that seem unconscionable 
(e.g. to make staff redundant or to offer generous exit pack-
ages), because not to do so may jeopardise the fulfilment 
of the objects.
This is not the fault of the charity trustees, the law-mak-
ers, or those other bodies who regulate the charitable sec-
tor. It is an issue of public understanding, or lack thereof, 
which sits at the heart of the matter, and which we argue 
needs urgently to be addressed. For some time now, there 
has been evidence of a trajectory of diminishing public 
trust in charities (Radojev 2016b; Charities Aid Founda-
tion 2015). This is important for two reasons. First, it is 
important because how people feel about charities impacts 
on the ability of these organisations to raise funds, as well as 
to attract employees, volunteers and other resources. It has 
been estimated that the damage to the charity ‘brand’ fol-
lowing the publication of several high-profile media reports 
during the summer of 2015 could cost the UK charitable 
sector more than £6.5 billion (Martin 2015). In turn, this 
impacts on the ability of charities to help those who are 
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reliant on their support. Second, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, it matters because not only are charities powerful and 
influential actors that shape how we think and behave as 
a society (Ainsworth 2012; O’Halloran 2011; Hernes and 
Garston 2009), arguably they are also symbolic representa-
tions of society’s highest ideals of goodness. If public trust 
in charities is to be strengthened and sustained in the short 
term, there needs to be better public understanding of the 
duties and constraints laid upon charities, and the complex 
challenges to which these give rise. In the longer term, it 
will be beneficial for public policy-makers, in consultation 
with other key stakeholders, to consider how improvements 
to the current situation may best be delivered.
In respect of business corporations, we can ask what posi-
tive responsibilities shareholders have as a consequence of 
the moral discretion we have argued that they possess. It 
is true that, in most cases, shareholders have only indirect 
control over the actions of directors (e.g. through voting on a 
director’s removal). However, they can exercise their voting 
rights to collectively determine the interests of the corpora-
tions in which they invest, without reference to the ‘public 
benefit’ criterion (or an equivalent external interest) that 
restricts a charity’s objectives. Our analysis suggests that 
an investigation into the moral requirements incumbent upon 
shareholders in the exercise of their voting rights should 
be central to an understanding of the corporation’s proper 
purpose. Is it warranted to assume, for example, that share-
holders authorise directors to pursue profit maximisation (or 
‘shareholder value’), as Friedman (1970) asserts? Accord-
ing to Stout (2012a, p. 1), it is a mistake to believe that 
shareholders generally have the same interest in maximising 
financial gain: ‘there is no single shareholder value—differ-
ent shareholders have different needs and interests depend-
ing on their investing time frame, degrees of diversification 
and interests in other assets, and perspectives on corporate 
ethics and social responsibility. Shareholder value ideology 
focuses on the interests of only a narrow subgroup of share-
holders…’ Her argument resonates with that of Sandberg 
et al. (2014), mentioned earlier, that beneficiaries of institu-
tional funds do not have uniform interests in financial gain, 
and most tend to believe that social, ethical and environmen-
tal considerations are relevant to the investment decisions 
made on their behalf.
However, despite these findings, empirical evidence from 
UK-based companies indicates that support among share-
holders for resolutions holding directors to specific ethical 
and environmental standards is weak (Mansell 2013, p. 592). 
For example, Buchanan et al. (2010, p. 7) found that just 2% 
of shareholder proposals focus on social and environmental 
concerns such as the implementation of International Labour 
Organization (ILO) standards or providing a sustainability 
report (ibid., p. 21). Furthermore, such proposals ‘garner 
the lowest vote support and have the lowest passing rate 
compared to other types of proposals’ (2010, p. 8). Similarly, 
Ertimur et al. (2011, p. 537) conclude that of shareholder 
proposals that target executive remuneration, those which 
align the objective of executive pay with social and envi-
ronmental concerns have the poorest success rate (cited in 
Mansell 2013, p. 592).
The normative case can nonetheless be made that share-
holders are responsible for monitoring how their corpo-
rations act and thus for ensuring that their organisations’ 
agency is exercised morally. In other words, ethical consid-
erations ought to be part of the joint deliberations through 
which shareholders hold directors to account. As List and 
Pettit (2011, p. 159) argue, if a group’s members ordinarily 
act upon moral judgements in their personal lives, there is 
no reason why issues of moral concern that bear upon the 
group’s interests cannot be subject to collective discussion 
and resolution.
As we observed above, it might be thought morally 
legitimate for shareholders to pursue financial gain to the 
exclusion of other goals, because equity markets are increas-
ingly dominated by institutional investors who are, in turn, 
beholden to their beneficiaries for maximising the financial 
value of their investments. As Lydenberg (2014, p. 287) 
observes, under modern portfolio theory fiduciaries act 
‘rationally’ when they prioritise short-term economic gains, 
and this ‘rational’ approach crowds out considerations of 
how fiduciaries serve ‘the lives of their beneficiaries and 
world in which they live’ (p. 290). However, concordant with 
the findings of Sandberg et al. (2014), he argues we should 
ask not what ‘rational’, short-term financial interest requires 
of fiduciaries, but instead what should be expected of a rea-
sonable fiduciary. The latter would determine ‘what, in their 
best judgement, the objective state of their beneficiaries and 
the world in which they live is and whether their invest-
ment decisions on the whole are contributing positively to 
that state’ (p. 294). When investors take more than financial 
value into account, they must ask questions ‘about whether 
their investments have a net positive effect on the economy 
(including society and the environment) and the financial 
system as a whole’ (p. 296).
Conclusion
Charities have tended to be regarded as worthy and admira-
ble organisations. Business corporations, by contrast, have 
been characterised in the popular imagination as ‘soulless’ 
entities that lack a capacity for moral judgement. We exam-
ined how English and UK law shape the scope for moral 
agency in charities and business corporations and found, 
counter-intuitively, that the exercise of moral agency by 
charities is limited to a greater extent than it is for business 
corporations. This is because English law places specific 
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restrictions on the ‘objects’ pursued by a charity’s trustees, 
of which there is no equivalent in the general fiduciary duties 
owed by the directors of a business corporation. In turn, 
shareholders have greater latitude to shape the purposes 
of their organisations, even in the context of institutional 
investment, than charity trustees possess. For example, the 
law bestows exclusive powers upon shareholders to alter a 
corporation’s constitution and to hold directors account-
able for the firm’s performance, whereas charity trustees—
confined to the pursuit of a specific purpose approved in 
law—have no such independence. We concluded that the 
explanation lies partly in how the law constitutes business 
corporations and charities: the former as an entity governed 
to promote the ‘internal’ interests of its own members, and 
the latter as a trusteeship designed to serve the ‘external’, 
public interest safeguarded (in this context) by the Charity 
Commission for England and Wales.
Two key implications for charities are to be drawn. First, 
the disconnection between the duties and constraints laid 
upon trustees by charity law and the public perception of 
how charities ought to behave has contributed to diminishing 
levels of trust in these organisations. This needs urgently to 
be addressed through public education. We hope that this 
paper begins that process. Second, despite the constraints we 
have identified there is value in charity trustees taking time, 
on a regular basis, to ask penetrating questions of their col-
lective moral position and individual consciences. Charities 
which subject their strategic, operational and other business 
decisions, to scrutiny of this sort, will be better placed to 
retain and grow public trust than those which do not, for 
they will at least be able to demonstrate and explain why 
(seemingly) morally questionable decisions have been taken.
There are implications, too, for public policy-makers. 
Current and future governments, together with other key 
stakeholders, need to think about and discuss what they 
want, and what it is reasonable to expect, from charities by 
comparison with non-charitable organisations. We hope that 
by setting out how charities are constrained from exercising 
moral agency, through a juxtaposition with the case of the 
business corporation, we have provided a way forward for 
that reflection and debate; for, clearly, change is needed. Its 
delivery will not be straightforward, however, and setting out 
the form which it should take is beyond the scope of the pre-
sent paper. Charities are complex organisations, operating 
in complex environments and facing complex challenges: 
public policy interventions will need to be sensitive to this 
and appropriately nuanced.
Finally, with regard to business corporations, our analy-
sis provides an additional reason to question the collective 
purpose of shareholder investment and the extent to which 
share price, or another measure of financial gain, either is or 
should be the overriding goal. Our comparison with chari-
ties illuminates the fact that whereas the former are held to 
the standard of ‘public benefit’, business corporations have 
broader scope to pursue objectives that reflect the particular 
interests of their members. It can therefore be argued that 
despite shareholders’ position at the centre of corporate gov-
ernance having received sustained criticism in recent years 
(e.g. from Ireland 2010; Sacconi 2011; Deakin 2012; Stout 
2012b; Veldman and Parker 2012), while the law concen-
trates authority in their hands, there is reason to ask to what 
end they should use it. This is especially the case in the 
context of ‘shareholder activism’ and calls for greater ‘say 
on pay’ (Marriage 2017; Marlow 2017).
How can moral considerations (for example, regarding 
social, ethical and environmental issues) be better integrated 
into the process through which shareholder powers are exer-
cised? While an examination of this problem is beyond the 
scope of the present article, there are at least two promising 
fields of research in this area. One is, as we have seen, a 
renewed normative enquiry into the scope of the fiduciary 
duties owed by institutional investors to their beneficiar-
ies. This research, which argues for an extended remit for 
institutional investors beyond that of financial gain, comple-
ments philosophical work on the positive duties owed by 
shareholders to other stakeholders (Mansell 2013; cf. Hsieh 
2017). A second development in this field concerns the 
mechanisms through which shareholders commit to the val-
ues of the corporations in which they invest. Mayer (2013, 
pp. 8–9), for example, develops the concept of a ‘trust firm’, 
i.e. a firm that identifies a set of values to be protected by a 
board of trustees, and commits controlling shareholders to 
hold their shares for a fixed time period, thereby delineating 
‘for how long and over what activities the corporation can 
credibly commit…’ (p. 8). In summary, an appreciation for 
the limits that different organisations (including charities 
and business corporations) face in determining and pursuing 
their own objectives helps to delimit the ethical questions 
that should be asked, both of how they use the resources 
entrusted to them, and to what end.
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